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INTRODUCTION
In January 2007, Siti Fadilah Supari, Indonesia’s Minister of
Health, alerted the World Health Organization (“WHO”) that her
country would no longer submit samples of locally-discovered avian
influenza viruses for international research.1 Rejecting a half-century
custom of free virus-sharing, 2 Indonesia claimed a sovereign right of

1. See Indonesia to Stop Formally Announcing Bird Flu Deaths, USA TODAY,
June 5, 2008, available at http://www.usatoday.com/news/health/2008-06-05indonesia-birdflu_N.htm[hereinafter Formally Announcing] (citing concerns that
the samples would be used to develop vaccines that Indonesia and other
developing countries could not afford).
2. See Peter Gelling, Indonesia Defiant on Refusal to Share Bird Flu Samples,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 26, 2007, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/03/26/
world/asia/26cnd-flu.html (explaining that currently, the custom is for contributing
countries to send samples to WHO-affiliated labs in the United States, Britain,
Japan, and Australia, which then develop prospective vaccines). Virus-sharing is a
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ownership over virus strains found within its borders. 3 As the site of
an overwhelming number of the world’s human avian influenza
incidences, 4 Indonesia’s cooperation is critical to international efforts
to check the virus that has the potential to become the next
worldwide pandemic. 5
This Comment explores the legality of Indonesia’s decision to
withhold avian influenza samples from the international community
and argues that, while viruses are sovereign property under the U.N.
Convention on Biological Diversity (“CBD”), Indonesia is violating
the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights’
(“ICESCR”) guaranteed right to health. Part I offers background
information on avian influenza and Indonesia’s history with the
virus. 6 Additionally, Part I introduces two international laws that are
implicated by Indonesia’s decision to withhold virus samples: the
CBD 7 and the ICESCR. 8 Part II.A contends that although viruses are
sovereign property under the CBD, but that Indonesia may
nevertheless be violating it. 9 Parts II.B and II.C further argue that

process by which countries donate virus specimens to internationally-cooperative
laboratories for research and vaccine development purposes.
3. See Siti Fadilah Supari, Minister of Health of the Republic of Indonesia,
Address Before the 60th World Health Assembly (May 16, 2007), available at
http://www.depkes.go.id/en/1605th.htm [hereinafter Supari Address] (invoking the
U.N. Convention on Biological Diversity as the legal basis for sovereign
ownership of local viruses).
4. See, e.g., More than 80 Pct of Indonesia Bird Flu Cases Die, REUTERS,
Aug. 13, 2008, http://www.reuters.com/article/americasCrisis/idUSN13258075
[hereinafter More Bird Flu Cases Die] (reporting that Indonesia is home to onethird of all human avian influenza infections and the local mortality rate from this
virus is notably higher than the global rate).
5. See Aubrey Belford, Indonesia’s Bird Flu Warrior Takes on the World,
MACAU DAILY TIMES, Dec. 8, 2008, available at http://www.macaudaily
timesnews.com/index2.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=20100&Itemid=
(explaining that a viral mutation that leads to easy inter-human transmission could
cause millions of deaths and that such a mutation would most likely occur in
Indonesia).
6. See discussion infra Part I (explaining that human-to-human avian
influenza transmission is currently rare, that the virus has hit Indonesia harder than
any other country, and that Indonesia freely shared virus samples until 2007).
7. United Nations Convention on Biological Diversity, June 5, 1992, 1760
U.N.T.S. 79 [hereinafter CBD].
8. International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, Dec. 16,
1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter ICESCR].
9. See discussion infra Part II (determining that viruses are genetic resources
under the CBD and examining the CBD’s prohibition on harming other countries’
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Indonesia is violating the ICESCR by withholding virus samples. 10
Part III recommends the solicitation of an advisory opinion from the
International Court of Justice (“ICJ”), 11 the reformation of the
international virus-sharing system, 12 and Indonesia’s return to
compliance with international law. 13

I. BACKGROUND
H5N1 avian influenza, or “bird flu,” is a potentially lethal,
naturally-occurring virus in birds. 14 The WHO recorded the first case
of a bird-to-human avian influenza transmission in Hong Kong in
1997. 15 Although human-to-human avian influenza transmission
currently remains rare, 16 if the virus became easily communicable
among humans, the consequence could be pandemic. 17
biological diversity).
10. See discussion infra Part II (concluding that Indonesia’s policy is a
deliberately retrogressive measure and interferes with other countries’ right to
health).
11. See discussion infra Part III.A (asserting that an ICJ advisory opinion on
the legality of withholding virus samples would carry enough weight to break the
current stalemate).
12. See discussion infra Part III.B (arguing for a system whereby cooperative
nations will receive greater access to discounted vaccines).
13. See discussion infra Part III.C (advocating Indonesia’s resumption of virussharing in light of the magnitude of dangers posed by non-compliance).
14. See Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Fact Sheet: Key Facts
About Avian Influenza (Bird Flu) and Avian Influenza A (H5N1) Virus, at 1 (Dep’t
of Health & Human Serv. June 30, 2006), http://www.cdc.gov/flu/avian/geninfo/pdf/avian_facts.pdf [hereinafter Key Facts] (reporting that the highly
pathogenic form of avian influenza can kill between ninety and one hundred
percent of infected birds within forty-eight hours).
15. See WORLD HEALTH ORG. [WHO], Avian Influenza (“bird flu”) – Fact
Sheet, Feb. 2006, http://www.who.int/mediacentre/factsheets/avian_influenza/
en/index.html (reporting that direct contact was the cause of eighteen human cases
that occurred concurrently with the outbreak of a virtually identical virus in Hong
Kong poultry farms and markets).
16. See Key Facts, supra note 14, at 2 (observing that human-to-human
transmission has never “continue[d] beyond one person”). But see Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention, Avian Influenza: Current Situation (Dep’t of
Health & Human Serv. June 15, 2007), http://www.cdc.gov/flu/avian/outbreaks/
pdf/current.pdf at 2 [hereinafter Current Situation] (suspecting human-to-humanto-human transmission within an Indonesian family in 2006).
17. See Current Situation, supra note 16, at 1 (noting that humans possess
limited natural immunity to avian influenza); see also Lawrence O. Gostin &
Benjamin E. Berkman, Pandemic Influenza: Ethics, Law, and the Public’s Health,
59 ADMIN. L. REV. 121, 124-25 (2007) (predicting 89,000 to 1.9 million deaths in
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Viruses, such as avian influenza, have hereditary properties. 18
Influenza viruses reproduce after attaching to living cells and
combining their own RNA with protein from the cell. 19 This RNA
holds hereditary information that it transmits to the new viruses, 20
which then mirror the genetic properties of the initial virus absent
mutation. 21 It is exactly this mutation, however, that could cause
avian influenza to become easily transmissible among humans,
creating a real risk of pandemic. 22

A. INDONESIA’S HISTORY OF AVIAN INFLUENZA AND COOPERATION
WITH THE WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION
Indonesia is the epicenter of the global avian influenza problem.
Following the first instance of human infection reported in 2005,
new cases have emerged at a worrisome pace. 23 Furthermore, the
virus’s human mortality rate is trending upward, increasing from
the United States and 2 million to 369 million deaths globally could occur
depending on the severity of the pandemic).
18. See Australian Academy of Science, Bird-Flu Glossary, NOVA SCIENCE IN
THE NEWS, http://www.science.org.au/nova/090/090glo.htm (last visited Mar. 25,
2009) (describing a genetic mutation as an alteration in the hereditary units of the
DNA or RNA of viruses).
19. See Science Blog, New Understanding Of How Influenza Virus Is Formed,
1997,
http://www.scienceblog.com/community/older/1997/A/199700923.html
(describing the process as a virus “replicat[ing] itself”).
20. See Pamela Peters, BIOTECHNOLOGY: A GUIDE TO GENETIC ENGINEERING
(1993), excerpt available at http://www.accessexcellence.org/RC/AB/BC/
Into_the_Looking_Glass.php (explaining that hereditary material is transmitted
when the cells burst, releasing new virus particles, which infect more cells).
21. See Jane Lloyd, The Bird Flu: Are We Ready for a Pandemic?, U.N.
CHRON. ONLINE EDITION,
http://www.un.org/Pubs/chronicle/2005/issue4/
0405p64.html (last visited Mar. 25, 2009) (noting that the avian influenza
mutations that can render the disease transmissible to humans may occur during
the normal course of virus reproduction or by re-assortment where avian influenza
and another type of influenza are simultaneously present in a single cell and swap
genetic information).
22. See Anita Manning, Bird Virus Could Mutate into Pandemic Flu, Scientists
Warn, USA TODAY, Jan. 21, 2004, at 90, available at http://www.usatoday.com/
news/health/2004-01-22-sars-and-flu-usat_x.htm (explaining mutation causing
human-to-human transmission could occur when avian influenza encounters
human influenza and they are able to exchange genes).
23. See Endang R. Sedyaningsih et al., Towards Mutual Trust, Transparency
and Equity in Virus Sharing Mechanism: The Avian Influenza Case of Indonesia,
37 ANNALS ACAD. MED. SING. 482, 483 (2008) (reporting an average of five new
cases per month from September 2005 to May 2007 and three new cases per month
from June 2007 to December 2007).
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sixty-three percent mortality in 2005 to eighty percent in 2006 and
nearly eighty-six percent in 2007. 24 The prevalence of free-roaming
chickens makes containing the virus within Indonesia particularly
difficult. 25
Customarily, the international community has freely shared
influenza virus samples by sending specimens to the WHO, 26 a
practice that plays a key role in global health. 27 From 2005 to 2007,
Indonesia fully complied with this tradition. 28 In January 2007,
however, Indonesia began withholding avian influenza samples from
the WHO sharing program. 29 Subsequently, Indonesia has submitted
samples only sporadically. 30
The Minister of Health, Siti Fadilah Supari’s justification for
Indonesia’s non-participation was twofold. First, third parties were
using samples without Indonesia’s consent, in violation of the WHO
Guidance for the Timely Sharing of Influenza Viruses
(“Guidance”). 31 The Guidance requires prior informed consent from

24. Id. at 484.
25. See, e.g., Seth Mydans, Indonesian Chickens, and People, Hard Hit by Bird
TIMES,
Feb.
1,
2008,
at
A3,
available
at
Flu,
N.Y.
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/02/01/world/asia/01flu.html (explaining that eighty
percent of Indonesia’s 1.4 billion chickens run loose in villages and cities).
26. See, e.g., WHO Adopts Resolution on Flu Virus Sharing, CENTER FOR
INFECTIOUS DISEASE RES. & POL’Y, May 23, 2007, http://www.cidrap.umn.edu/
cidrap/content/influenza/panflu/news/may2307who.html
[hereinafter
WHO
Adopts] (calling the free international exchange of viruses a “long tradition”).
27. See David P. Fidler, Influenza Virus Samples, International Law, and
Global Health Diplomacy, 14 EMERGING INFECTIOUS DISEASES 88, 88 (2008),
available at http://www.cdc.gov/eid/content/14/1/pdfs/88.pdf (explaining that virus
inaccessibility would hamper global surveillance, development of diagnostic tests,
and intervention plans).
28. See Sedyaningsih et al., supra note 24, at 482-83 (claiming that Indonesia
submitted all samples to WHO participating laboratories in the eighteen months
following the first identified human case in July 2005). But see Richard Holbrooke
& Laurie Garrett, Op-Ed, ‘Sovereignty’ That Risks Global Health, WASH. POST,
Aug. 10, 2008, at B07 (alleging that Indonesia failed to submit samples beginning
in 2005).
29. Formally Announcing, supra note 1.
30. See Sedyaningsih et al., supra note 24, at 486 (asserting that Indonesia
submitted two samples in August of 2007, leaving thirty-three specimens unsent
since deciding to withhold samples).
31. WHO, Guidance for the Timely Sharing of Influenza Viruses/Specimens
with Potential to Cause Human Influenza Pandemics, at 1 (Mar. 2005), available
at http://www.sdnpbd.org/sdi/issues/health/birdflue/other/timelysharing .pdf.
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the donating party before use. 32 Second, the virus sharing system,
according to Supari, was inherently inequitable to the detriment of
developing nations. Rather, the Minister of Health claimed that drug
companies were selling patented vaccines created from the donated
samples at prices that Indonesians could not afford. 33 Accordingly,
Indonesia asserted a claim of ownership over domestic viruses, citing
the CBD as precedent. 34

B. THE CONVENTION ON BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY
Following its entry into force in December of 1993, scholars
considered the CBD a novel agreement for its integration of
environmental and developmental objectives. 35 The CBD articulates
three objectives: (1) biodiversity conservation, (2) sustainable use,
and (3) just benefit-sharing. 36 Article 3, stating the CBD’s principle,
places a responsibility upon states not to act in a way that will cause
extraterritorial, environmental harm. 37 Articles 3 and 15 of the CBD,
however, also place considerable emphasis on state sovereignty. 38
States are allocated full control over local biodiversity. 39 Article 15
enshrines this convergence of sovereignty and the CBD’s
objectives. 40 In a departure from tradition, 41 Article 15 codifies a
32. Id.; see also Supari Address, supra note 3 (claiming that third parties used
Indonesia’s samples in presentations, publications, and applications for patents
without permission).
33. See Supari Address, supra note 3.
34. See id. (arguing that viruses fall within the authority of the CBD because
they are genetic resources); see also Makarim Wibisono, Op-Ed, The Responsible
Virus and Sharing Benefits, JAKARTA POST, Aug. 27, 2008, available at http://
www.thejakartapost.com/news/2008/08/27/the-responsible-virus-and-sharing-bene
fits.html (stating that viruses are “unequivocally, genetic resources subject to
national sovereignty”).
35. See Catherine Tinker, A “New Breed” of Treaty: The United Nations
Convention on Biological Diversity, 13 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 191, 191-93 (1995)
(recognizing the CBD as one of a “new breed” of treaties that balance interests of
developing and developed countries).
36. CBD, supra note 7, art. 1.
37. Id. art. 3.
38. See id. arts. 3, 15 (recognizing the sovereign right of States to exploit and
control access to their own resources).
39. See Alejandro Grajal, Biodiversity and the Nation State: Regulating Access
to Genetic Resources Limits Biodiversity Research in Developing Countries, 13
CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 6, 6 (Feb. 1999) (describing the right as “one of the most
radical philosophical features” of the CBD).
40. See CBD, supra note 7, art. 15 (recognizing “the sovereign rights of States
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State’s sovereign authority to regulate access to its genetic
resources. 42 The article further requires, as a basis for access,
mutually agreed upon terms and prior informed consent. 43 Finally,
the article reiterates the CBD’s goal of promoting equitable sharing
of genetic resources. 44
Indonesia believes that viruses, including avian influenza, are
genetic resources within the meaning of the CBD and Article 15. 45
Therefore, Indonesia also believes that, under Articles 3 and 15, it is
justified in withholding virus samples, and that other Countries have
violated its rights to mutually agreed terms of access, prior informed
consent, and equitable benefit-sharing. 46 “Viral sovereignty,” as
commentators have coined the concept, 47 has not remained
exclusively Indonesian—other states have used or considered
adopting the idea. 48

over their natural resources”).
41. See, e.g., Aphrodite Smagadi, Analysis of the Objectives of the Convention
on Biological Diversity: Their Interrelation and Implementation Guidance for
Access and Benefit Sharing, 31 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 243, 244-46 (2006) (averring
that international law had traditionally regarded genetic resources as a part of the
global commons).
42. Id. art. 15(1).
43. CBD, supra note 7, art. 15(4)-(5).
44. See id. art. 15(7) (requiring States to take “legislative, administrative, or
policy measures” to ensure a fair distribution of the benefits derived from genetic
resources).
45. See Supari Address, supra note 3 (alleging an international failure to
respect Indonesia’s sovereign right to control access to avian influenza samples).
46. See supra Part I.A (explaining that Dr. Supari asserted that the WHO
Guidelines for the Sharing of Influenza Viruses had been violated for the same
reasons).
47. See, e.g., Holbrooke & Garrett, supra note 29 (explaining that Indonesia’s
Minister of Health, Dr. Supari, first used the term to mean that viruses are the
sovereign property of individual nations).
48. See id. (reporting that India endorsed viral sovereignty in a clash with
Bangladesh and that the 112-nation organization, Non-Aligned Movement,
weighed formal adoption of the idea in November 2008).
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C. THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND
CULTURAL RIGHTS
Indonesia acceded to the ICESCR in February of 2006. 49 Among
the most significant provisions of the ICESCR is the human right to
health. 50 Article 12 of the ICESCR affirms a right to the “highest
attainable standard” of health and requires parties to take affirmative
steps toward realization of that aim. 51 Explicit among those
compulsory affirmative steps is the management of infectious
diseases, codified in Article 12(2)(c). 52
The right to health expounded in the ICESCR is not a right to be
healthy. 53 In fact, the right to health is analogous to a reasonableness
standard rather than an absolute guarantee. This is necessary to
account for states’ disparate wealth, capacities, and afflictions. 54
What the ICESCR does require, is a national effort to protect the

49. Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights
[OHCHR], ICESCR Ratifications and Reservations, http://www2.ohchr.org/
english/bodies/ratification/3.htm (last visited Mar. 25, 2009).
50. See Hans V. Hogerzeil et al., Is Access to Essential Medicines as Part of
the Fulfilment [sic] of the Right to Health Enforceable Through the Courts?, 368
LANCET 305, 305 (2006) (stating that the ICESCR is a foundational source of legal
obligations concerning the right to health).
51. ICESCR, supra note 8, art. 12 (listing provisions to decrease infant
mortality and, the health of children; to enhance environmental and industrial
cleanliness; to prevent, treat, and control infectious diseases; and to make medical
services available to all).
52. Id. art. 12(2)(c).
53. See, e.g., Judith Asher, About the Right to Health, in THE RIGHT TO
HEALTH: A RESOURCE MANUAL FOR NGOS (Commonwealth Medical Trust 2004),
available at http://www.amnestyusa.org/poverty-and-human-rights/health-andhuman-rights/about-the-right-to-health/page.do?id=1104611 (explaining that States
are not expected to protect citizens from, or treat citizens for any, and every
malady but that States are responsible for providing facilities and conditions that
are necessary for good health).
54. See Alicia Ely Yamin, The Right to Health Under International Law and
Its Relevance to the United States, 95 AM. J. OF PUB. HEALTH 1156, 1156 (July
2005) (noting particularly dramatic differences in health standards between the
global North and South); see also Benjamin Mason Meier & Larisa M. Mori, The
Highest Attainable Standard: Advancing a Collective Human Right to Public
Health, 37 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 101, 115-16 (2005) (observing that the right
to health is an exception to the traditional rigidity of human rights because states
may differ in their approaches and resources).
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health of a country’s citizens to the greatest extent that resource
constraints allow. 55
The ICESCR’s commitment to the modes of health’s attainment is
not consigned solely to the local level. 56 In addition to satisfying the
right to health, individual states must guard their right in the same
from third party obstruction. 57 Furthermore, Article 2 compels states
to take not only individual steps toward the realization of ICESCR
objectives, but also international cooperative and assistive
measures. 58
In 2000, the U.N. Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights issued General Comment 14, 59 an explanation of ICESCR
Article 12’s content.60 Regarding the text of Article 12’s section 2(c),
General Comment 14 describes disease “control” as individual and
cooperative work that provides access to appropriate technology and
employs disaggregated epidemiological information. 61 More
generally, General Comment 14 commands immediate and ongoing
“deliberate, concrete and targeted” steps toward the right to health’s

55. See ICESCR, supra note 8, art. 2(1) (mandating individual and
internationally cooperative efforts “to the maximum of [states’] available
resources”).
56. See U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC], Comm. on Econ., Soc. and
Cultural Rights, General Comment No. 14: The Right to the Highest Attainable
Standard of Health, ¶¶ 38-42, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/2000/4 (Aug. 11, 2000)
[hereinafter General Comment 14] (explaining Article 12’s international
obligations, which include mandatory respect for other states’ right to health, a
collective responsibility to deal with communicable diseases, and a ban on
medicine and medical equipment embargoes for political leverage).
57. See Philippe Cullet, Patents and Medicine: the Relationship Between
TRIPS and the Human Right to Health, 79 INT’L AFF. 139, 148 (2003), available at
http://www.ielrc.org/content/a0301.pdf (suggesting that states adopt legislative,
administrative and other measures to prevent third parties from interfering with the
right to health).
58. ICESCR, supra note 8, art. 2(1) (noting the particular importance of
economic and technical international cooperation).
59. General Comment 14, supra note 56 (recognizing health as a fundamental
human right for all to enjoy to the greatest possible degree).
60. Id. ¶ 6; see also MATTHEW C.R. CRAVEN, THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANT
ON ECONOMIC, SOCIAL, AND CULTURAL RIGHTS: A PERSPECTIVE ON ITS
DEVELOPMENT 90-91 (Ian Brownlie ed., 1995) (explaining that the Committee on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights issues General Comments, conceptually
interpreting the ICESCR in order to foster common understanding of the
ICESCR’s standards).
61. General Comment 14, supra note 56, ¶ 16.
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attainment. 62
Taking
backward
steps
is
presumptively
63
impermissible.
General Comment 14 further outlines states’ specific international
obligations. 64 Aside from cooperating with other states, 65 parties to
the ICESCR must respect other states’ rights to health. 66
Additionally, General Comment 14 recognizes that communicable
diseases present a special worldwide concern, demanding an
international collective effort to manage it. 67

II. ANALYSIS
Differing reactions have met Indonesia’s decision to withhold
avian influenza samples. 68 Indonesian officials, however, believe
they are acting well within the law. 69 Although the CBD permits
Indonesia’s declaration of viruses as sovereign property, by
withholding avian influenza samples from the WHO, Indonesia
violates the ICESCR’s right to health and may violate the CBD’s
prohibition on harming extraterritorial biological diversity.

62. Id. ¶ 30.
63. See id. ¶ 32 (explaining that “deliberately retrogressive measures” will shift
the burden of proof to the state to show that all alternatives were properly
considered and the action was justified viewing all of the ICESCR’s rights in light
of the state’s resource limitations); see also Yamin, supra note 54, at 19
(illustrating that scaling back a State-run antiretroviral drug program due to
financial constraints is a retrogressive measure).
64. General Comment 14, supra note 57.
65. See ICESCR, supra note 8, art. 2(1); General Comment 14, supra note 56,
¶ 38.
66. See General Comment 14, supra note 56, ¶ 39 (explaining that states should
prevent third parties from interfering with other states’ right to health via available
political or legal measures).
67. Id. ¶ 40.
68. Compare Holbrooke & Garrett, supra note 29 (labeling Indonesia’s actions
as “morally reprehensible”), with Belford, supra note 5 (reporting Health Minister
Supari has been labeled a hero by many Indonesians for standing up to the Western
world).
69. See Supari Address, supra note 3 (arguing that viruses are regulated by the
CBD to which Indonesia is a party); Wibisono, supra note 34 (deeming “viral
sovereignty” to pre-date the present controversy and that viruses are
“unequivocally” genetic resources subject to national sovereignty); Sedyaningsih
et al., supra note 23, at 485 (asserting that the CBD protects a state’s right to allow
or disallow access to virus specimens).
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A. VIRUSES ARE “GENETIC RESOURCES” WITHIN THE MEANING OF
ARTICLE 15 OF THE CONVENTION ON BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY
BECAUSE THEY HAVE ACTUAL MONETARY VALUE AND POTENTIAL
SOCIAL VALUE

Article 15 of the CBD codifies a sovereign right to exercise
dominion over genetic resources. 70 The CBD defines a genetic
resource as “genetic material of actual or potential value.” 71 Genetic
material is further sub-defined as “any material of plant, animal,
microbial or other origin containing functional units of heredity.” 72
Furthermore, the CBD’s supplement, the Cartagena Protocol on
Biosafety, explicitly acknowledges that viruses are “living
organism[s],” which transfer or replicate genetic matter. 73
To qualify as a genetic resource under the CBD, however, a virus
must also be actually or potentially valuable. 74 Avian influenza, like
all viruses, has functional hereditary properties. Therefore, it and
other virus samples have social value in their critical importance to
the development of new and effective vaccines. 75 Moreover,
Indonesia’s contract negotiation to sell avian influenza samples to
American company Baxter Healthcare demonstrates that the virus
has actual monetary value. 76
Some have argued, however, that one must measure value, not in
unqualified terms, but in relation to the CBD’s objectives of

70. CBD, supra note 7, art. 15(1).
71. Id. art. 2.
72. Id.
73. Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety to the Convention on Biological Diversity,
art. 3(h), Jan. 29, 2000, 39 I.L.M. 1027, available at http://www.cbd.int/
doc/legal/cartagena-protocol-en.pdf (defining a “living organism” as “any
biological entity capable of transferring or replicating genetic material, including
sterile organisms, viruses and viroids”).
74. CBD, supra note 7, art. 2.
75. See Nick Huber, Brussels Gives Green Light to Glaxo’s Bird Flu Vaccine,
GUARDIAN, May 19, 2008, http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2008/may/19/
glaxosmithklinebusiness.pharmaceuticals (revealing that GlaxoSmith-Kline
created a vaccine using Indonesian and Vietnamese samples, donated 50 million
doses to the WHO, and sold other doses to multiple national governments).
76. Cf. Donald G. McNeil Jr., Indonesia May Sell, Not Give, Bird Flu Virus to
Scientists, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 7, 2007, at A6, available at http://www.nytimes.com/
2007/02/07/world/asia/07birdflu.html [hereinafter Indonesia May Sell Bird Flu].
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conservation and sustainable use. 77 The conclusion reached from this
line of reasoning is that viruses have no value in conserving or
sustaining biodiversity unless they are shared. 78 Although this
argument is true for the actual value of viruses, it ignores, and in fact
actually implicitly concedes, potential value. 79 Additionally,
subjugating the CBD’s sovereignty principles to the status of a
“regulatory instrument” for attaining the conservation and
sustainable use objectives 80 ignores the CBD’s equitable benefitsharing objective. 81 Part of the CBD’s novelty lies in the interaction
of sovereignty and benefit-sharing, balancing the distinct selfinterests of access to genetic material and access to the benefits of
technology and money as a means of promoting equitable sharing. 82
Where each party wants what the other owns, the playing field is
leveled and benefits may flow both ways. 83 Further, where
technology-rich countries receive access to virus samples and
developing countries receive access to affordable vaccines, it will
promote the conservation of biodiversity. 84

B. INDONESIA’S DECISION TO WITHHOLD AVIAN INFLUENZA
SAMPLES DIMINISHES GLOBAL CAPACITY TO CONTROL THE VIRUS
AND, THEREFORE, CAN HARM THE BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY OF
OTHER NATIONS IN VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 3 OF THE CONVENTION
ON BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY
Article 3 of the CBD requires state parties to take care that actions
within their borders do not cause extraterritorial harm. 85 However, an
attempt to keep all local biodiversity, including viruses, within state
77. See Fidler, supra note 27, at 91 (arguing that “value” stems from the ability
to protect, conserve, and sustainably use resources).
78. Id.
79. See id. (maintaining that viruses are valuable if they are shared for vaccine
development which helps mitigate biodiversity and infection dangers).
80. See id. (contending the CBD’s sovereignty principle is an ineffectual way
to facilitate the goal of international virus-sharing).
81. See CBD, supra note 7, art. 1 (asserting that the benefit-sharing objective is
on equal footing with the conservation and sustainable use objectives).
82. See Tinker, supra note 35, at 194-95 (distinguishing the CBD from
traditional treaties where developing nations have had little bargaining power).
83. See, e.g., id. at 194 (describing the exchange between developed and
developing countries as a “trade-off” between access to genetic resources and
access to the technology that can harness those resources).
84. Cf. Fidler, supra note 28, at 90-91.
85. CBD, supra note 7, art. 3.
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boundaries is an exercise in futility. 86 For this reason, some have
called granting states a sovereign right to a virus “ludicrous.” 87
Former Indonesian Ambassador to the United Nations, Makarim
Wibisono, concedes that no one can block viruses at the border,
rather nearly all genetic resources traverse state boundaries. 88
This boundless movement of viruses, however, is precisely why
sample sharing is vital to preserving biodiversity and public health. 89
For example, an Asian strain of the virus, caused the avian influenza
spate that killed 2,600 birds in Great Britain in 2007. 90 In 2005 and
2006, an avian influenza strain directly connected to strains in
Russia, China, and Mongolia appeared in Turkey. 91 Indonesia’s
decision to withhold virus samples from the WHO frustrates global
surveillance of avian influenza’s spread and the development of
effective diagnostic tests and vaccines to recognize and combat the
virus. 92 The diminished ability to track, diagnose and treat avian
influenza means a diminished ability to preserve biodiversity.
86. See, e.g., Tinker, supra note 36, at 203 (conceding that microbes cannot be
confined within national boundaries and underscoring that seed and plant
smuggling is hard to detect).
87. Holbrooke & Garrett, supra note 29 (noting that migratory birds can take
viruses across international borders).
88. Wibisono, supra note 35 (listing birds, plants, insects, microbes, and crops
among those resources that cross borders).
89. Cf. Donald G. McNeil Jr., Scientists Warn that Bird-Flu Virus Remains a
Threat, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 15, 2007, available at http://www.nytimes.com/
2007/02/15/health/15avian.html (recounting avian influenza’s spread from Asia to
Europe to Africa and reporting that both Britain and Nigeria have culled hundreds
of thousands of birds after outbreaks); Press Release, World Health Organization,
Indonesia to Resume Sharing H5N1 Avian Influenza Virus Samples Following a
WHO Meeting in Jakarta (Mar. 27, 2007), http://www.who.int/mediacentre/news/
releases/2007/pr09/en/index.html [hereinafter Indonesia to Resume Sharing]
(acknowledging the need to find a balance between sharing viruses for purposes of
vaccine development with ensuring that developing countries benefit from this
development).
90. Jon Ungoed-Thomas & Steven Swinford, Britain Hit by Killer Bird Flu,
TIMES ONLINE, Feb. 4, 2007, http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/uk/
article1323823.ece (hypothesizing that wilds birds are the most likely source of
introduction of the virus to one of Britain’s largest poultry producers).
91. Turkey Bird Flu is Deadly Strain, BBC NEWS, Oct. 13, 2005,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/4337918.stm.
92. See Fidler, supra note 28, at 88 (highlighting Indonesia’s importance in the
effort to check avian influenza because of its volume of infections); see also
Huber, supra note 82 (reporting most avian influenza vaccines need to be modified
after four to six months, which is typically when a new strain of the virus
emerges).
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Instead, states will cull domesticated birds suspected of infection by
the thousands, 93 rare wild birds will continue to die, 94 and people
could destroy the habitats of many other species in an effort to
combat avian influenza’s spread. 95
It is uncertain whether Indonesia’s decision to withhold avian
influenza samples would cause other countries sufficient harm to
invoke Article 3 of the CBD. 96 Because Article 3 places
responsibility on States only for “activities” inside its borders, 97 an
alleged violation would require a showing that Indonesia’s failure to
provide specimens was the cause of damage in another country, not
simply that a virus originated in Indonesia. 98 For example,
Indonesia’s policy decision not to report local avian influenza
outbreaks 99 might induce a country, believing there had been no

93. See, e.g., Pakistan Detects ‘Mild’ Bird Flu, BBC NEWS, Feb. 27, 2006,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/4755126.stm (reporting 25,000 domestic
birds were culled in Pakistan in 2006 as a precaution after the appearance of the
mild pathogenic form of avian influenza in neighboring India).
94. See Scott Weidensaul, Op-Ed, Cull of the Wild, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 30, 2005,
at
A3,
available
at
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/11/30/opinion/30
weidensaul.html (informing that avian influenza in China killed as many as ten
percent of the world’s bar-headed geese); see also Rare Birds to be Culled Over
Bird Flu, CHINA POST, Feb. 18, 2004, available at http://www.chinapost.com.tw/
taiwan/2004/02/18/46047/Rare-birds.htm (reporting that two protected species of
pheasant were to be slaughtered in China).
95. See BirdLife International, BirdLife Statement on Avian Influenza,
http://www.birdlife.org/action/science/species/avian_flu/ (last visited Mar. 27,
2009) (alleging that some governments’ plans to drain wetlands to discourage
waterfowl’s presence could be a more substantial threat to nature than avian
influenza).
96. Cf. Indonesia May Sell Bird Flu, supra note 83 (quoting epidemiologist Dr.
Arnold S. Monto as saying that withholding avian influenza samples will cause
Indonesia greater harm than any other country, but that Indonesia’s neighbors bear
a substantial risk as well).
97. CBD, supra note 7, art. 3 (“States have . . . the sovereign right to exploit
their own resources pursuant to their own environmental policies, and the
responsibility to ensure that activities within their jurisdiction or control do not
cause damage to the environment of other States . . . .”).
98. See Tinker, supra note 36, at 203-04 (highlighting that signatories to the
CBD have the freedom to design their own strategies, but have obligated
themselves to be responsible for negative extraterritorial consequences of those
strategies).
99. See WHO Upset Over Indonesia’s Shift in Avian Flu Reporting, CBC
NEWS, June 6, 2008, http://www.cbc.ca/health/story/2008/06/06/who-avianflu.html
(citing Indonesia’s decision to report avian flu deaths only twice per year instead
of as they occur).
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recent occurrences of avian influenza there, to purchase Indonesian
poultry that it would not have purchased with full knowledge of
outbreaks. 100 Were that purchased poultry actually infected with
avian influenza that subsequently spread to domestic wildlife, the
importing country would have a valid Article 3 complaint. 101 In that
case, Indonesia’s policy decision, rather than just the indigenous
virus, would have negatively affected another country’s environment
in violation of the CBD Article 3. 102

C. INDONESIA’S DECISION TO WITHHOLD AVIAN INFLUENZA
SAMPLES VIOLATES ARTICLE 12 OF THE INTERNATIONAL
COVENANT ON ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS
Article 12 of the ICESCR codifies a human right to health and
compels states to take affirmative steps toward its realization,
including the management of infectious diseases. 103 In addition to
obligations toward its own citizens, 104 a party to the ICESCR also
has international obligations regarding the right to health. 105
Indonesia’s policy of withholding avian influenza samples from the
WHO, although not an embargo of medicine or medical equipment,
is a deliberately retrogressive measure and an obstacle to other
states’ enjoyment of the right to health.

100. Cf. U.S. Dep’t of State, U.S. Embassy Jakarta, Indonesia, Economic
Section, More Avian Flu Outbreaks in Indonesia, http://www.usembassy
jakarta.org/econ/avian_flu.html (last visited Mar. 28, 2009) (reporting that
Singapore and Malaysia discontinued Indonesian poultry imports in 2003 after
rumors of avian influenza outbreaks).
101. See Tinker, supra note 36, at 205 (explaining that a state’s policy choices
are not directly challengeable until they result in some harmful “transboundary
effect”).
102. See id. at 203-04 (explaining that state actions causing harm beyond that
state’s jurisdiction violate Article 3).
103. ICESCR, supra note 8, art. 12.
104. See, e.g., General Comment 14, supra note 57, ¶¶ 34-37 (enumerating
broadly the obligations to respect, protect, and fulfill citizens’ right to health).
105. See id. ¶¶ 38-41 (listing an obligation to respect other states’ right to health,
to work cooperatively to control infectious diseases, and to refrain from using
access to medicines as a political tool).
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1. Indonesia’s actions are not an embargo on medicine or medical
equipment
General Comment 14 directs states to avoid imposing embargoes
and restrictions on medicine and medical equipment. 106 The
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights has recognized
the close relationship between economic sanctions and the rights
enumerated in the ICESCR. 107 Although Indonesia is certainly
restricting access to its supply of avian influenza samples for
political and economic purposes, 108 this does not implicate a
violation of the ICESCR’s right to health because there is no directly
restricted access to medicine or medical equipment. 109 The
prohibition on embargoes impairing other states’ right to health,
which the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights drew
comparatively narrowly, contemplates only restrictions of medicine
and medical equipment. 110

106. See id. ¶ 41 (forbidding such restrictions for political and economic
leverage).
107. See generally ECOSOC, Comm. on Econ., Soc. and Cultural Rights,
General Comment No. 8: The Relationship Between Economic Sanctions and
Respect for Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1997/8 (Dec.
12, 1997) (distinguishing permissible economic and political pressure on a
government from impermissible collateral human rights consequences on
vulnerable segments of society).
108. See Wibisono, supra note 35 (explaining that Indonesia seeks to reform the
virus-sharing system and secure vaccines at reasonable prices); see also Belford,
supra note 5 (characterizing Indonesia’s view of the current virus-sharing system
as “unfair . . . and not equitable”).
109. See, e.g., Holbrooke & Garrett, supra note 29 (accusing Indonesia only of
withholding avian influenza samples and information).
110. Compare General Comment 14, supra note 57, ¶ 41 (prohibiting only
certain restrictions on supplies of medicine and medical equipment), with
ECOSOC, Comm. on Econ., Soc. and Cultural Rights, General Comment No. 15:
The Right to Water, ¶ 32, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/2002/11 (Jan. 20, 2003) (prohibiting
restrictions on supplies of water and “all goods and services essential for securing
the right to water”), and ECOSOC, Comm. on Econ., Soc. and Cultural Rights,
General Comment No. 12: The Right to Adequate Food, ¶ 37, U.N. Doc.
E/C.12/1999/5 (May 12, 1999) (prohibiting restrictions on supplies of food and
“similar measures which endanger conditions for food production and access to
food”).
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2. Indonesia’s actions are deliberately retrogressive measures
Actions deliberately retrogressive to the realization of the right to
health are presumptively incompatible with Article 12. 111 A state
may overcome the presumption, however, by showing that they
implemented the action only after a thorough contemplation of
alternatives and can defend the measure as the greatest use of that
state’s available resources with respect to the totality of rights the
ICESCR enumerates. 112 The Committee on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights has tolerated retrogressive steps on these grounds in
the context of state emergencies such as economic crisis, natural
disaster, and armed conflict. 113
Although the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
has not proffered a concrete definition of “deliberate retrogressive
measure,” one suggested interpretation is, “any measure that implies
a step back in the level of protection accorded to the rights contained
in the [ICESCR] which is the consequence of an intentional decision
by the State.” 114 Indonesia made a deliberate policy decision to
withhold avian influenza samples in protest.115 Indonesian citizens
will suffer reduced access to avian influenza vaccines, both in
quantity and quality, as a collateral effect of their government’s
decision. 116 Under the ICESCR, the collateral retrogressive effects of

111. General Comment 14, supra note 57, ¶ 32.
112. Id.
113. See, e.g., ECOSOC, Comm. on Econ., Soc. and Cultural Rights,
Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties under Articles 16 and 17 of
the Covenant: Concluding Observations of the Committee on Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights: Croatia, ¶¶ 7, 18, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1/Add.73 (Dec. 5, 2001)
(expressing concern over worsening standards of living, but acknowledging the
effects of armed conflict had negatively affected Croatia’s ability to implement the
ICESCR).
114. MAGDALENA SEPÚLVEDA, THE NATURE OF THE OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE
INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS 32326 (2003) (conceding the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
traditionally has not rigidly scrutinized these measures).
115. See Supari Address, supra note 3 (indicating Indonesia sought to draw
attention to the inequities in the virus-sharing system); see also Sedyaningsih et al.,
supra note 24, at 485-86 (explaining that a “breakdown of trust” among the virussharing community prompted Indonesia’s decision to withhold specimens).
116. See Claudia D. Surjadjaja, Vaccines and the Justice of Reciprocity,
JAKARTA POST, Mar. 12, 2007, available at http://www.indonesia-ottawa.org/
information/details.php?type=news_copy&id=3795 (recognizing Indonesia is
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an intentional decision are no more acceptable than the direct
retrogressive effects. 117 As such, Indonesia’s policy is a deliberate
retrogressive measure under General Comment 14, and is
presumptively violative of ICESCR Article 12 until Indonesia rebuts
the presumption. 118
That Indonesia aims to highlight inequity in the international
virus-sharing mechanism and is working toward the ability to
produce its own vaccines 119 does not automatically excuse its
citizens’ current diminished protection. 120 General Comment 14
pardons retrogressive measures only after a state shows it used
limited resources to their utmost and thoroughly surveyed alternative
options. 121 However, Indonesia, has not exhausted all alternatives. 122
Similarly, resource constraints pose no obstacle to Indonesia’s virussharing compliance. 123 For these reasons, Indonesia is unable to
refute adequately General Comment 14’s presumption of

unable to quickly and effectively manufacture vaccines on its own); see also
Indonesia May Sell Bird Flu, supra note 83 (arguing that rebuffing the world’s best
laboratories will primarily hurt Indonesia itself).
117. See SEPÚLVEDA, supra note 126, at 323-24 (emphasizing, through
examples of deliberately retrogressive measures, that only the action taken need be
intentional, not the effects).
118. See General Comment 14, supra note 57, ¶ 32 (permitting retrogressive
measures only after showing “the most careful consideration” of all options and
appropriate allocation of limited resources).
119. See Joint Statement from the Ministry of Health of Indonesia & WHO,
Sharing of Avian Influenza Viruses and Pandemic Vaccine Production (Feb. 16,
2007), available at http://www.who.int/mediacentre/news/statements/2007/s02/en/
index.html [hereinafter Joint Statement] (suggesting local vaccine production as
the long-term solution to access problems).
120. See General Comment 14, supra note 57, ¶ 32 (placing the burden of
justifying the retrogressive health effects on the offending state).
121. See SEPÚLVEDA, supra note 126, at 327-32 (concluding that a state
defending retrogressive measures as a result of resource limitations must show
exhaustion of resources at hand, impliedly including solicitation of international
assistance).
122. Cf. Government Told to Sue WHO Over Virus Samples, JAKARTA POST,
Feb. 10, 2007, available at http://old.thejakartapost.com/yesterdaydetail.asp?fileid
=20070210.H02
123. See WHO, Regional Office for South-East Asia, Guidelines on Laboratory
Diagnosis of Avian Influenza, at 16-17 (2007), available at http://www.searo.
who.int/LinkFiles/CDS_CDS-Guidelines-Laboratory.pdf (explaining that the
WHO will cover shipping costs National Influenza Centers incur upon sending
influenza samples to WHO collaborating centers).
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impermissibility, and it is, therefore, in violation of ICESCR Article
12. 124
3. Indonesia’s actions interfere with other countries’ enjoyment of
the right to health
General Comment 14 obligates states to respect other states’
enjoyment of the right to health. 125 In the context of the ICESCR, to
“respect” means to avoid obstruction of the enjoyment of any of the
enumerated rights. 126 For the purposes of Article 12, a violation of
the obligation to respect occurs when an action is likely to cause
injury or unnecessary illness and death. 127
Indonesia’s decision to withhold avian influenza samples from the
WHO negatively affects the global supply of vaccines and threatens
global health. 128 Without access to Indonesian avian influenza
specimens, manufacturers may be producing vaccines that are less
effective against a newly emerged strain, leaving countries
worldwide with a supply of outdated vaccines. 129 Similarly, denial of
Indonesian specimens hampers international avian influenza
surveillance, 130 which is essential to controlling the risk of a
pandemic. 131 The Indonesian policy’s deleterious effect on the global
124. Cf. General Comment 14, supra note 57, ¶ 32.
125. See id. ¶ 39 (including an obligation to block third parties from interfering
with other countries’ right to health where possible).
126. ECOSOC, Comm. on Econ., Soc. and Cultural Rights, Maastricht
Guidelines on Violations of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, ¶ 6, U.N. Doc.
E/C.12/2000/13 (Oct. 2, 2000).
127. See General Comment 14, supra note 57, ¶ 50 (listing as an example the
purposeful withholding of information necessary for effective health protection or
treatment).
128. See Editorial, Indonesia’s Avian Flu Holdout, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 16, 2007,
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/02/16/opinion/16fri1.html [hereinafter
Flu Holdout].
129. See WHO: Indonesia Won’t Share Bird Flu Vaccine Research,
FOXNEWS.COM, Feb. 8, 2007, http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,250909,00.
html (explaining Indonesia’s experience with avian influenza makes access to
specimens all the more important for vaccine development).
130. See Bryan Walsh, Indonesia’s Bird Flu Showdown, TIME, May 10, 2007,
available at http://www.time.com/time/health/article/0,8599,1619229,00.html
(explaining that the world only has a partial understanding of the avian flu
situation in Indonesia since it stopped sharing virus samples).
131. See U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Serv., Global Activities,
PandemicFlu.gov, http://www.pandemicflu.gov/global/index.html (last visited Jan.
16, 2009) (citing detection, isolation, and notification as critical to mitigating any

2009]

VIRAL SOVEREIGNTY

963

capacity to manage avian influenza is likely to result in unnecessary
illness and death, 132 violating its Article 12 obligation to respect
other states’ enjoyment of health. 133
Because of the inability to control transmissibility beyond national
borders, General Comment 14 also imposes on states a collective
duty to address the threat of infectious diseases. 134 Indonesia’s
actions, however, obstruct global efforts to tackle avian influenza’s
risk. 135 Indeed, because Indonesia is in a position to assist other
countries in realizing the right to health by providing valuable
information on a pandemic threat, 136 the ICESCR, U.N. Charter, and
international law require it to do as much. 137 Furthermore,
Indonesia’s international non-cooperation is the result of
unwillingness, not inability, to cooperate. 138 Indonesia’s actions
constitute a violation of the ICESCR’s mandate to allocate the
maximum of available resources toward realization of the right to
health. 139
pandemic threat).
132. See Walsh, supra note 143 (explaining that the WHO’s senior
representative on pandemic influenza believes Indonesia’s actions put the world at
a higher risk of pandemic); see also Belford, supra note 5 (reporting that a past
leader of Indonesia’s doctor’s association suspects the world will hold Indonesia
responsible if unable to contain a future avian influenza outbreak).
133. General Comment 14, supra note 57, ¶ 39.
134. See id. ¶ 40 (averring developed nations have a further responsibility and
self-interest in helping developing nations control infectious diseases); see also
Supari Address, supra note 3 (acknowledging containment requires “a collective,
holistic effort, reflecting a spirit of solidarity”).
135. See Fidler, supra note 28, at 88 (stating that Indonesia’s actions
detrimentally affect avian influenza’s global surveillance, diagnosis, and
intervention strategies).
136. See Walsh, supra note 143 (explaining scientists need access to Indonesia’s
exceptionally lethal avian influenza to monitor virus mutations that could trigger
pandemic); see also WHO: Indonesia Won’t Share Bird Flu Vaccine Research,
supra note 142 (stating that access to new strains is critical to fabricating vaccines
to counter dominant strains most likely to cause pandemic).
137. See ECOSOC, Comm. on Econ., Soc. and Cultural Rights, General
Comment No. 3: The Nature of States Parties Obligations, ¶14, U.N. Doc.
E/1991/23, annex III at 86 (1991)(Dec. 14, 1990) (describing that all states, but
particularly those in a place to assist, have an obligation to work cooperatively
toward the realization of the ICESCR’s rights).
138. See Sedyaningsih et al., supra note 24, at 486 (citing failed trust and
inequitable benefit-sharing as the motivating factors leading to the decision to
withhold samples).
139. ICESCR, supra note 8, art. 2(1); see General Comment 14, supra note 57,
¶9 (declaring the reluctance to commit available resources to the achievement of
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III. RECOMMENDATIONS
Urgent action is needed to mitigate further hindrance to pandemic
risk control. 140 Globalization has caused diseases to spread much
more quickly than in the past. 141 Previous influenza pandemics took
only four months to circle the globe. 142 As a consequence, the world
must regard the control of infectious diseases as an international
undertaking. 143

A. THE WHO SHOULD REQUEST AN ADVISORY OPINION FROM THE
INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE REGARDING THE LEGALITY OF
WITHHOLDING VIRUS SAMPLES FROM INTERNATIONAL HEALTH
FACILITIES

Lacking a definitive violation of the CBD, other countries are
unable to invoke the treaty’s dispute resolution mechanisms. 144
Under the U.N. Charter though, the WHO has the ability to request
an advisory opinion of the ICJ. 145 Although an ICJ advisory opinion
traditionally will not be binding, it will carry substantial authority
and legitimacy. 146
An advisory opinion on the propriety of withholding avian
influenza specimens could do much to settle the on-going dispute
over the policy’s legality. 147 In 1996, the WHO sought an advisory

the right to health a violation of Article 12 obligations).
140. See U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Serv., Global Monitoring,
PandemicFlu.gov, http://www.pandemicflu.gov/outbreaks/samplesharing.html (last
visited Nov. 7, 2008).
141. See Meier & Mori, supra note 55, at 106 (citing AIDS, SARS, mad cow
disease, avian influenza, and drug-resistant tuberculosis as diseases that have been
transmitted from developing countries to developed countries).
142. See Walsh, supra note 143 (noting the most recent influenza pandemics
occurred in 1957 and 1968, before modern widespread jet travel).
143. See Yamin, supra note 55, at 1156 (suggesting that a solution to the
problem will require cooperation by the North and South).
144. See CBD, supra note 7, art. 27 (requiring negotiation and mediation before
arbitration or submission to the International Court of Justice).
145. See U.N. Charter art. 96, para. 2 (granting U.N. organs and specialized
agencies the right to seek an advisory opinion from the Court).
146. See Int’l Court of Justice, Advisory Jurisdiction, http://www.icjcij.org/jurisdiction/index.php?p1=5&p2=2 (last visited Mar. 29, 2009)
(recognizing non-binding advisory opinions from the ICJ often play important
peace-keeping and preventative roles).
147. Cf. Kiely Lewandowski, Serbia Urges UN to Call for ICJ Opinion on
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opinion on whether the use of nuclear weapons could ever comply
with international environmental and health mandates, but the ICJ
declined to answer because it was essentially a referendum on the
use of nuclear weapons in general, which is outside the scope of the
WHO’s activities. 148 The management of the international virussharing system, however, is directly related to the right to health,
which is enshrined in the WHO Constitution. 149 As such, the legal
question of whether withholding virus samples is permissible under
international law arises within the scope of the WHO’s activities, and
should therefore be within the ICJ’s jurisdiction to decide.

B. THE WHO SHOULD ADD INCENTIVES TO THE INTERNATIONAL
VIRUS SHARING APPARATUS SO AS TO ENCOURAGE DEVELOPING
NATIONS TO PROVIDE VIRUS SPECIMENS AND INFORMATION

Indonesia has stated that it does not seek to sell virus samples for
profit, but rather to gain access to vaccines for the very afflictions to
which the country is most susceptible. 150 A virus-sharing system
Kosovo, JURIST, Sept. 12, 2008, http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/paperchase/2008/09/
serbia-president-urges-un-to-call-for.php (reporting Serbian President Boris Tadic
wanted the United Nations to seek an advisory opinion on the legality of Kosovo’s
independence because the opinion is “the most deserving interpretation of the
principles of international legal order,” and would significantly ease tensions).
148. See Legality of the Use by a State of Nuclear Weapons in Armed Conflict,
Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 66, 84 (July 8, 1996) (explaining that ICJ
jurisdiction requires the requesting agency to be authorized to do so under the U.N.
Charter, the opinion sought to be a question of law, and the question to arise within
the requesting agency’s scope of actions). But see id. at 97 (Shahabuddeen, J.,
dissenting) (suggesting that a different reading of the WHO’s question would put
the legal question within the scope of the agency’s activities).
149. See WHO, Constitution of the World Health Organization, art. 1, July 22,
1946, 14 U.N.T.S. 185 (declaring the objective of the WHO to be humanity’s
realization of the highest possible health status).
150. See Supari Address, supra note 3 (advocating for a more just virus-sharing
system, including fair apportionment of resultant drugs and vaccines); Indonesia
Says Bird Flu Virus-Sharing Battle Not About Money, JAKARTA POST, Apr. 24,
2008, available at http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2008/04/24/indonesiasays-bird-flu-virussharing-battle-not-about-money.html [hereinafter Not About
Money] (listing the establishment of a multilateral trust fund, tiered pricing, and
bulk purchasing as potential acceptable options affording developing nations
vaccine access); Acep Somantri & Benny YP Siahaan, International Solidarity
Secures Global Health, JAKARTA POST, Sept. 10, 2008, available at http://
www.thejakartapost.com/news/2008/09/10/international-solidarity-secures-globalhealth.html (arguing that under the current system, developing nations would likely
have little or no chance to obtain vaccines in the event of a pandemic).
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acceptable to all parties should promote the contribution of
samples, 151 equitably share the benefits derived from contributed
samples, 152 bolster developing countries’ access to vaccines, 153 and
still respect national sovereignty. The WHO should consider
modifying the international virus-sharing system to allow
cooperative, developing countries greater access to low-cost vaccines
than deliberately non-compliant developing countries.
Currently, because of its uncooperative policies, Indonesia should
not receive assistance with purchasing vaccines. However, were it to
again show a commitment to complying with virus-sharing customs,
the WHO should afford Indonesia the option of buying vaccines at a
bulk rate or through a tiered pricing scheme. 154 Because avian
influenza mutates rapidly and thus requires that vaccines be
constantly updated to be effective, 155 states will have an incentive to
continually cooperate in order to ensure their long-term ability to
procure vaccines because the vaccines they purchase this month may
not be effective against the virus in six months.

C. THE INDONESIAN GOVERNMENT SHOULD RESUME SENDING
AVIAN INFLUENZA SAMPLES TO THE WHO IN ORDER TO COMPLY
WITH INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATIONS
To comply with international law, Indonesia should resume
sending avian influenza samples to the WHO. Although Indonesia’s
ultimate purpose may be noble, the stakes are too serious to justify
its means. 156 Avian influenza is the potential source of the next

151. See Fidler, supra note 28, at 88 (arguing that the lack of Indonesian virus
samples jeopardizes important avian influenza objectives).
152. See Joint Statement, supra note 132 (emphasizing the need for short-term
and long-term solutions to protect developing countries from threats).
153. See Sedyaningsih et al., supra note 24, at 486 (contending that those
nations most affected by disease are the same nations whose samples lead to the
development of vaccines that those countries are then unable to afford).
154. See Not About Money, supra note 166 (reporting the WHO received
suggestions to consider different states’ abilities to pay when implementing
vaccine acquisition mechanisms).
155. See Manning, supra note 22 (explaining that avian influenza often collects
genetic material from influenza viruses in other species).
156. See, e.g., Belford, supra note 5 (reporting that even those who sympathize
with Indonesia question the prudence of the tactics); Holbrooke & Garrett, supra
note 29 (labeling Indonesia’s actions “morally reprehensible” because they
increase the likelihood of a pandemic).
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human pandemic, which could cause millions of deaths worldwide.
The virus’ particular lethality and prevalence in Indonesia makes
access to their samples of paramount importance.
Certainly Indonesia’s aim of raising awareness of an inequitable
virus-sharing system is laudable. 157 It should not, however, justify
endangering global health. Resumed cooperation in the virus-sharing
system would permit important viral research and monitoring to
continue unimpeded, 158 while simultaneously allowing a serious
international discussion regarding the defective state of the WHO
virus-sharing apparatus, to which Indonesia has successfully drawn
the world’s attention. 159

CONCLUSION
Timely sharing of dangerous virus specimens is of global
importance. In pandemic prevention, imperfect knowledge produces
imperfect containment efforts. Indonesia’s decision to withhold avian
influenza samples from the international community with the
purpose of bringing about a more equitable virus-sharing system is a
perilous tactic that endangers both Indonesians and people around
the world. Although Indonesia has, indeed, drawn attention to an
international virus-sharing scheme in need of reform, its noble end
does not justify its dangerous means. A swift and lasting resolution
to the standoff, in the form of an ICJ advisory opinion on the legality
of withholding virus samples and the reformation of the WHO’s
virus-sharing mechanism, is necessary to adequately protect global
health.

157. See, e.g., Flu Holdout, supra note 141 (acknowledging that the current
virus-sharing schemes do not adequately protect developing countries ); Walsh,
supra note 143 (quoting the WHO senior representative who expressed
appreciation after learning about the developing countries’ concerns regarding
inequity).
158. See, e.g., Paul Watson, Scientists Warn Against Closing Navy Lab, BOSTON
GLOBE, July 7, 2008, available at http://www.boston.com/news/world/asia/articles/
2008/07/07/scientists_warn_against_closing_navy_lab/ (indicating scientists could
be caught off-guard and unprepared by avian influenza mutations without steady
research of Indonesia’s strains).
159. See, e.g., Indonesia to Resume Sharing, supra note 96 (stating the WHO
welcomes the global attention drawn to developing countries’ experience with the
virus-sharing system).

